Content note: This post talks about psychosis, distress and burnout. Please look after yourself, and step away if you need to.
Time has never felt linear to me. It spirals and stretches until I lose the edges of the day, and then it folds three hours into what feels like ten minutes. The clock on my kitchen wall keeps its steady pace while the time I actually live changes shape completely. Recently I fell into deep monotropic flow around two in the morning and surfaced at six, hungry, with pins and needles and no sense of the hours passing.
My sense of time follows my attention, and the two feel bound together. Monotropism describes how Autistic attention tends to pull deeply into a few channels rather than spreading evenly across many (Murray et al., 2005). When I am held in one of those channels, time opens out and melts. When my attention loops around a worry that won’t let go, time becomes endless instead.
Henri Bergson gave me words for this over a century after he wrote them. He separated clock time, which cuts life into equal units, from durée, lived time, which he compared to a melody where each note melts into the next (Bergson, 1889/1910). Deleuze (1968/2014) took this further, arguing that each repetition makes something new. My memories work like that, arriving alive and slightly changed each time a scent or sound carries me back, sitting in my present and lingering in possible futures. I have started calling the gap between clock time and felt time a double temporality problem, borrowing from Milton’s (2012) double empathy problem, because I spend so much energy translating between the two. That translation is quiet, constant and exhausting.
Clock time has a long history. Kusters (2020) traces it back to Aristotle, who tied time to movement and gave us a before, a now and an after that could be measured. David reads measured time as closer to a record of entropy, and neither of us recognises it as the shape of a lived life. He describes the present as a liminal space between past and future, where we are deterritorialising and reterritorialising at once. Starlight makes this visible. The light we see at night left its source long ago, so the past reaches us and becomes part of our present, and in witnessing it our bodyminds (Dychtwald, 1977/1978) are changed as we become with the universe.
I am slowly opening up about my own experiences of perceiving the world in ways other people say aren’t real. In those moments time turns kaleidoscopic. The future seems to vanish while the past catches up, and I am left stuck in a present that refuses to stay still. Phenomenologists such as Minkowski (1933/1970) and Fuchs (2013) describe how lived time can fragment in psychosis, its quiet flow breaking into separate frames. David knows time running almost in reverse, and moments of living several possible scenarios at once, time moving sideways as well as backwards and forwards. I don’t want to give any of this a glossy tint. Not knowing whether it is day or night can be truly frightening.
The words we use matter. Schizophrenia comes from the Greek for split mind, and the concept David and I have been proposing, symphrenia, means a deeply connected bodymind that thinks and feels with the world, sometimes more deeply than it can hold. Karen Barad (2007) argues that things come into being through intra-action, through their entanglements, and she writes of re-turning, the way earthworms turn soil over and over (Barad, 2014). That image led me to a phrase I want to keep: symphrenic time. I picture it as many omnidirectional spirals of past, present and future tangling together, almost holographic. Yeats wrote of a centre that cannot hold. I am coming to think some of us need something that holds us without a centre at all, and for me community does a great deal of that holding.
Symphrenic time keeps company with other ways of living time. Marta Rose and KR Moorhead explore spiral time in their neuroqueer creative spaces. Alison Kafer (2013) describes crip time as bending the clock to meet disabled bodies and minds, and Ellen Samuels (2017) likens it to time travel. Aimee Sinclair (2025) writes of mad time as a refusal of time imposed on people deemed mad. I have been writing about water time through hydrofeminism (Neimanis, 2017), where stuck states and flowing states are phases of the same water, shifting at a threshold. I live several at once, my body asking for more time to move through the day with fluctuating pain while my monotropic mind lets whole hours dissolve.
If we honoured all of these ways of living time, perhaps everything would change, slowly or quickly, at whatever pace it needed. I suspect time deserves far more than one post, and Freeman’s (2010) Time Binds is waiting on my reading pile. Until then, enjoy your time, and thank you for spending some of it here.
You can hear David and me talking this through in our free bonus episode at thewiderexistence.co.uk. Stay weird and embrace symphrenia.
Support: In the UK, Samaritans are free to call any time on 116 123. The Hearing Voices Network and Mind both offer information and peer support.
References
Barad, K. (2007). Meeting the universe halfway: Quantum physics and the entanglement of matter and meaning. Duke University Press.
Barad, K. (2014). Diffracting diffraction: Cutting together-apart. Parallax, 20(3), 168–187.
Bergson, H. (1910). Time and free will: An essay on the immediate data of consciousness (F. L. Pogson, Trans.). George Allen & Unwin. (Original work published 1889)
Deleuze, G. (2014). Difference and repetition (P. Patton, Trans.). Bloomsbury. (Original work published 1968)
Dychtwald, K. (1978). Bodymind. Wildwood House. (Original work published 1977)
Freeman, E. (2010). Time binds: Queer temporalities, queer histories. Duke University Press.
Fuchs, T. (2013). Temporality and psychopathology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 12(1), 75–104.
Kafer, A. (2013). Feminist, queer, crip. Indiana University Press.
Kusters, W. (2020). A philosophy of madness: The experience of psychotic thinking (N. Forest-Flier, Trans.). MIT Press.
Milton, D. E. M. (2012). On the ontological status of autism: The ‘double empathy problem’. Disability & Society, 27(6), 883–887.
Minkowski, E. (1970). Lived time: Phenomenological and psychopathological studies (N. Metzel, Trans.). Northwestern University Press. (Original work published 1933)
Murray, D., Lesser, M., & Lawson, W. (2005). Attention, monotropism and the diagnostic criteria for autism. Autism, 9(2), 139–156.
Neimanis, A. (2017). Bodies of water: Posthuman feminist phenomenology. Bloomsbury.
Samuels, E. (2017). Six ways of looking at crip time. Disability Studies Quarterly, 37(3).
Sinclair, A. (2025). Who decides on time? Mad Time as a disruptor of normative research politics and practices. Frontiers in Sociology, 10, Article 1559616. https://doi.org/10.3389/fsoc.2025.1559616



